We measure how receiving information about coworkers' savings behavior affects recipients' savings choices. Low-saving employees were sent a simplified 401(k) plan enrollment or contribution increase form. A randomized subset of forms included information on the (high) fraction of coworkers either participating in or contributing at least 6% of pay to the plan. We document an oppositional reaction: peer information decreased the savings of (unionized) recipients who were not eligible for automatic enrollment in the 401(k). We find no significant evidence that peer information altered the savings decisions of recipients who had previously opted out of automatic 401(k) enrollment.
. Finally, individuals may directly derive utility from their consumption relative to their peers (Abel, 1990) .
In light of the theory and evidence on social influence, it is natural to ask whether interventions designed to harness the power of peer effects can alter financial decisions. By disseminating information about what a target population's peers typically do, it may be possible to teach people that a certain behavior is more (or less) common than they had previously believed, motivating those people to engage in the behavior more (or less) themselves. This class of interventions has been dubbed "social norms marketing" and is used at approximately half of U.S. colleges in an effort to reduce student alcohol consumption (Wechsler et al., 2003 ). An extensive literature finds that peer information interventions cause behavior to conform to the disseminated peer norm in non-financial domains. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) review the literature on herding and related phenomena in financial markets. For evidence of peer effects in other domains, see Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren (1990) , Case and Katz (1991) , Besley and Case (1994) , Hershey et al. (1994) , Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) , Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996) , Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000) , Kallgren, Reno, and Cialdini (2000) , Sacerdote (2001) , Munshi (2004) , Munshi and Myaux (2006) , Sorensen (2006) , Chalmers, Johnson, and Reuter (2008) , Gerber, Green, and Larimer (2008) , Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Ikäheimo (2008) , Kuhn et al. (2011) , and Narayanan and Nair (2011) . Manski (2000) provides an overview of issues in the social interaction literature. 2 For example, providing information about peers moves behavior towards the peer norm in domains such as entrée selections in a restaurant, contributions of movie ratings to an online community, small charitable donations, music downloads, towel re-use in hotels, taking petrified wood from a national park, and stated intentions to vote (Cai, Chen, and Fang, 2009; Chen et al., forthcoming; Frey and Meier, 2004; Salganik, Dodds, and Watts, 2006; Goldstein, Cialdini, and Griskevicius, 2008; Cialdini et al., 2006; Gerber and Rogers, 2009 ).
We use a field experiment to investigate the effect of a peer information intervention on retirement savings choices. Although one would not expect such an intervention to have effects on 401(k) participation and contribution rates as large as automatic enrollment (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi et al., 2002 and 2004; Beshears et al., 2008) , such a treatment is of interest to employers because automatic enrollment has the following limitations. First, many firms offer matching contributions, and automatic enrollment may increase the firm's spending on matching contributions for employees who place a relatively low value on retirement plan balances. 3 Second, even when an employer automatically enrolls newly hired workers, it often does not implement automatic enrollment for previously hired workers because it may be perceived as unfair to change the plan rules for this subpopulation. 4 Third, an employer who believes that many employees should have a high savings plan contribution rate may be hesitant to implement a correspondingly high default contribution rate because such a rate may be inappropriate for a subset of the workforce. Fourth, rigidity in collective bargaining agreements may prevent the implementation of automatic enrollment. Peer information interventions do not have these drawbacks, as they rely on individuals actively electing the options that are perceived to be best for their personal circumstances, and they are not subject to collective bargaining agreements.
Peer information interventions are also of practical interest because it may not be feasible to implement default enrollment in non-401(k) savings vehicles (such as IRAs).
Our field experiment yields a surprising result. Peer information interventions can generate an oppositional reaction: information about the high savings rates of peers can lead individuals to shift away from the peer norm and decrease their savings relative to a control group that did not receive peer information.
We conducted our experiment in partnership with a large manufacturing firm and its retirement savings plan administrator. Employees received different letters depending on their 401(k) enrollment status. Employees who had never participated in the firm's 401(k) plan were mailed Quick Enrollment (QE) letters, which allowed them to start contributing 6% of their pay to the plan with a pre-selected asset allocation by returning a simple reply form. Employees who 3 An employee might not value retirement plan balances because he has a high discount rate and perceives that he cannot increase current consumption as a result of having those balances. He may also not value retirement plan balances because he is unaware that he has them. Agnew et al. (2012) report that 12% of surveyed workers could not correctly answer whether they were currently contributing to their 401(k) plan, and only half of surveyed workers could even come close to correctly recalling the company's 401(k) match provisions. 4 Brown (2010) reports that 52% of employers with automatic enrollment only automatically enroll new hires.
had previously enrolled but were contributing less than 6% of their pay received Easy Escalation (EE) letters, which included a nearly identical reply form that could be returned to increase their contribution rate to 6%. Previous work has shown that these simplified enrollment and contribution escalation mechanisms significantly increase savings plan contributions (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 2009; Beshears et al., forthcoming) .
We assigned the QE and EE mailing recipients to one of three randomly selected treatments. The mailing for the first randomly selected treatment included information about the savings behavior of coworkers in the recipient's five-year age bracket (e.g., all employees at the firm between the ages of 25 and 29, all employees between the ages of 30 and 34, etc.). The mailing for the second randomly selected treatment contained similar information about coworkers in the recipient's ten-year age bracket (e.g., all employees at the firm between the ages of 20 and 29). The mailing for the third randomly selected treatment contained no peer information and therefore served as a control condition. For the QE recipients, the two peer information mailings stated the fraction of employees in the relevant age bracket who were already enrolled in the savings plan. For the EE recipients, the two peer information mailings stated the fraction of savings plan participants in the relevant age bracket contributing at least 6% of their pay on a before-tax basis to the plan.
Employees in our study naturally fall into four subpopulations distinguished along two dimensions: QE recipients versus EE recipients, and employees who by default were automatically enrolled at a 6% contribution rate unless they opted out (non-union workers at this firm) versus employees who by default were not enrolled unless they opted into the plan (union workers at this firm). Table 1 summarizes the key features of these four subpopulations. We distinguish along the first dimension because the QE and EE mailings make different requests of recipients: initial enrollment at a pre-selected contribution rate and asset allocation in the case of QE, and only an increase to the pre-selected contribution rate in the case of EE. The second dimension is important because it affects selection into our sample. Employees with a 6% contribution rate default had to actively opt out of their default to a contribution rate below 6% in order to be eligible for QE or EE, so no QE or EE recipient with this default was completely passive before the mailing. Similarly, employees with a 0% contribution rate default had to opt out of their default to a positive contribution rate below 6% in order to become eligible for EE.
5
5 If they later returned their contribution rate to 0%, they would still be eligible for EE.
But in order to be eligible for QE, all employees with a 0% contribution rate default had to be completely passive. This last subpopulation contains some employees who genuinely wanted to contribute nothing to the 401(k) and some employees who were contributing nothing simply because of inertia. Prior research shows that the inertial group is likely to be large (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi et al., 2002 and 2004; Beshears et al., 2008) . 6 Because people who are contributing little to the 401(k) simply because of inertia are likely to have weaker convictions about their optimal savings rate than people who have actively chosen to contribute little, we expect QE recipients with a 0% contribution rate default to be the subpopulation most susceptible to the peer information intervention that we studied.
In the taxonomy of Harrison and List (2004) , our study is a "natural field experiment,"
since subjects never learned that they were part of an experiment. We use administrative plan data to track contribution rate changes during the month following our mailing.
We measure the average effect of the presence of peer information by comparing how much more the peer information treatment groups increased their contribution rates than the control group. We also estimate the effect of the magnitude of the peer information value that employees saw. To do this, we exploit two sources of variation in the peer information value.
First, two employees of the same age were exposed to different peer information values if one was randomly assigned to see information about coworkers in her five-year age bracket and the other to see information about coworkers in her ten-year age bracket. Second, two employees who are similar in age but on opposite sides of a boundary separating adjacent five-year or adjacent ten-year age brackets would see different peer information values.
We find that among QE recipients with a 0% contribution rate default-those whom we expected to be most susceptible to our information treatment-receiving peer information significantly reduced by 3.6 percentage points the likelihood of subsequently enrolling in the plan, from 9.9% to 6.3%. Their enrollment was also decreasing in the magnitude of the peer information value communicated. A one percentage point increase in the reported fraction of coworkers already enrolled in the plan significantly reduced the enrollment rate by 1.8
percentage points and significantly reduced the average before-tax contribution rate change by 0.11% of income.
6 Prior to the mailing, the plan participation rate was 70% for employees with a non-enrollment default and 96% for employees with a 6% contribution rate default. The latter figure does not include employees with less than 90 days of tenure, since they are likely to have had automatic enrollment pending.
We do not find statistically significant evidence that the peer information intervention altered the savings behavior of the other three subpopulations that had previously opted out of their default. There is some indication that the magnitude of the peer information value reported matters for these subpopulations. Among QE recipients who had previously opted out of a 6%
contribution rate default, a one percentage point increase in the reported fraction of coworkers already enrolled in the plan increased the enrollment rate by 1.1 percentage points and increased the average before-tax contribution rate change by 0.06% of income. Among EE recipients who had opted out of a 6% contribution rate default, a one percentage point increase in the reported fraction of participants contributing at least 6% of their pay to the plan increased before-tax contribution rate changes by 0.07% of income. But these effects are only significant at the 10% level.
Our study contributes to the recent field experiment literature emphasizing peer information intervention treatment effect heterogeneity, including the possibility of perverse "boomerang effects" (Clee and Wicklund, 1980; Ringold, 2002) that produce the opposite of the intended consequences. Schultz et al. (2007) and Ayres, Raseman, and Shih (2009) Relative to these studies, an important contribution of our experiment is that it provides evidence distinguishing between two distinct possible forces behind boomerang effects: negative belief updates and oppositional reactions. The boomerang effects in previous field experiments could be driven by negative belief updates-individuals learning that the promoted behavior is less common than they previously believed and decreasing their own engagement in the behavior as a result (Schultz et al., 2007) . In contrast, it is likely that our boomerang effects are driven not by negative belief updates but instead by oppositional reactions. Our experiment varies the peer information value shown to individuals, and QE recipients with a 0% contribution rate default 7 Allcott (2011) also examines household responses to information about neighbors' energy consumption, but he does not find boomerang effects among households with low initial consumption.
are less likely to enroll in the savings plan when they see that a higher fraction of their peers are participating in the plan. Instead of shifting their behavior towards their updated beliefs about the peer norm, these individuals are shifting their behavior away from the peer norm. By providing empirical evidence for the existence of oppositional reactions, we highlight another channel through which the unintended consequences of financial decision-making interventions can overwhelm the intended consequences (see also Carlin, Gervais, and Manso, 2010) .
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides background information on the firm we study. Section II describes our experimental design, and Section III describes our data. Section IV presents our empirical results and discusses our findings. Section V concludes.
I. Company Background
The company that ran our field experiment is a manufacturing firm with approximately 15,000 U.S. employees. About a fifth of the employees are represented by one of five unions. In general, unionized workers are employed on the manufacturing shop floor, although not all shop floor workers are unionized. The firm offers both defined benefit and defined contribution retirement plans to its employees. The details of the defined benefit plans vary according to an employee's union membership, but a typical employee receives an annual credit of four to six percent of her salary in a cash balance plan, as well as interest credit on accumulated balances.
Upon retirement, the employee receives an annuity based on the notional balance accrued in the plan.
The details of the defined contribution plan, which is the focus of our study, also depend on an employee's union membership. In general, employees do not need to meet a minimum service requirement before becoming eligible for the plan. Participants can contribute up to 50% of their eligible pay to the plan on a before-tax basis, subject to IRS limits. 9 For most employees, the firm makes a matching contribution proportional to the employee's own contribution up to a threshold. These matching contributions vest immediately. Table 2 describes the matching formulas that apply to different employee groups. After-tax contributions to the plan are also allowed but do not garner an employer match. All employees can allocate plan balances among 9 In 2008, the year of the experiment, the annual contribution limit was $15,500 for workers younger than 50 and $20,500 for workers older than 50.
21 mutual funds, eleven of which are target date retirement funds. Employer stock is not an investment option.
On January 1, 2008, all non-union employees not already contributing to the 401(k) plan
were automatically enrolled at a before-tax contribution rate of 6% of pay unless they opted out or elected another contribution rate. 10 The default investment for automatically enrolled employees was the target date retirement fund whose target retirement date was closest to the employee's anticipated retirement date. Non-union employees hired after January 1, 2008 were also subject to automatic enrollment 60 days after hire unless they actively opted out. Automatic enrollment was not implemented for unionized employees until January 1, 2009-after our sample period ends-because the collective bargaining negotiations necessary to effect the change did not take place until the fall of 2008.
II. Experimental Design
The peer information intervention targeted non-participating and low-saving U.S.
employees who were at least 20 years old and at most 69 years old as of July 31, 2008. 11 Nonparticipants were defined as employees who were eligible for but had never enrolled in the 401(k) plan as of July 14, 2008. Two groups of non-participants were excluded from the intervention. The first group is employees who receive a special pension benefit in lieu of an employer match. 12 The second group is employees with a 6% default contribution rate who were within the first 60 days of their employment at the company on July 14, 2008 and had not opted out of automatic enrollment; these employees were likely to be automatically enrolled soon after the intervention date, so the intervention would serve little purpose for them. Low savers were defined as employees who were enrolled in the 401(k) plan but whose before-tax contribution rate was less than both their employer match threshold and 6% as of July 14, 2008. 13 The 10 Employees were informed in advance that they would be automatically enrolled unless they opted out. 11 Employees younger than 20 or older than 69 years of age were excluded from the intervention because there are so few employees in these categories that reporting peer information about these age groups could potentially divulge the savings decisions of individual employees. 12 Only 52 employees receive this special pension benefit but otherwise met the criteria for inclusion in the intervention. 13 We did not consider after-tax contribution rates when classifying low savers. Approximately 9% of plan participants make after-tax contributions, and approximately 9% of the employees we classified as low savers were making after-tax contributions at the time of the experiment. If we had limited the intervention to employees whose combined before-tax and after-tax contribution rates were less than both their employer match threshold and 6%, approximately 7% of the low savers would have been excluded. majority of employees in our experiment (72%) have a match threshold of 6%, but the match threshold varies by union status and is less than 6% for some unionized employees and greater than 6% for others (see Table 2 ).
14 We used a stratified randomization scheme to allocate intervention-eligible employees to three equally sized treatment groups. We first sorted employees into bins based on age as of July 31, 2008, plan participation status (enrolled or not enrolled), geographic location of workplace, and employer match structure (and therefore union status and contribution rate default). Within each of these bins, employees were randomly assigned to receive no peer information, information about the savings behavior of peers in their five-year age bracket, or information about the savings behavior of peers in their ten-year age bracket. Note that all of the 5-year brackets had end points at ages 24, 29, 34, etc. In other words, all subjects between ages 20 and 24 in the 5-year peer treatment saw the same peer information. Likewise, all of the 10-year brackets had end points at ages 29, 39, 49, etc. In other words, all subjects between ages 20 and 29 in the 10-year peer treatment saw the same peer information. Psychology research indicates that the effect of social comparisons on behavior is most powerful when the reference group is similar to the target individual on one or more dimensions, such as age (Jones and Gerard, 1967; Suls and Wheeler, 2000) .
On July 30, 2008, Quick Enrollment and Easy Escalation mailings were sent to target employees, and we surmise that employees received these mailings at some point between August 1 and August 4, 2008. Both the QE and EE mailings gave a deadline of August 22, 2008 for returning the forms, but this deadline was not enforced. Appendix A shows sample QE and EE letters.
Non-participants received a QE mailing, which described the benefits of enrollment in the 401(k) plan, especially highlighting the employer matching contribution. 15 By checking a box on the form, signing it, and returning it in the provided pre-addressed postage-paid envelope, employees could begin contributing to the plan at a 6% before-tax rate invested in an age-linked target date retirement fund. Employees were reminded that they could change their contribution rate and asset allocation at any time by calling their benefits center or visiting their benefits 14 One match formula limits employer matching contributions to a maximum of $325 per year. We did not observe the dollar amount of matching contributions as of July 14, 2008, so the definition of low savers did not exclude employees who had reached the maximum. The results of our analysis do not change meaningfully if all low savers who faced this match formula are dropped from the sample. 15 Information on employer contributions varied according to the match structure facing the individual employee.
website. The mailing sent to employees in the peer information treatments additionally displayed the following text: "Join the A% of B-C year old employees at [company] who are already enrolled in the [plan] ." Letters sent to employees in the no peer information control condition simply omitted this sentence. The number A was calculated using data on all savings-planeligible employees in the five-year or ten-year age bracket applicable to the recipient. These participation rates, reported in Table 3 , ranged from 77% to 93%. The numbers B and C are the boundaries of the relevant five-year or ten-year age bracket.
Low savers received EE mailings, which also emphasized that employees were foregoing employer matching contributions. 16 A low-saving employee could increase her before-tax contribution rate to 6%, invested according to her current asset allocation, by completing the form and returning it in the provided pre-addressed postage-paid envelope. Like the QE mailings, the EE mailings reminded recipients that they could change their contribution rate or asset allocation through their benefits call center or website. The EE peer information text, which did not appear in the mailings to employees in the no peer information control condition, read:
"Join the D% of B-C year old [plan] participants at [company] who are already contributing at least 6% to the [plan] ." Data on all plan participants in the relevant five-year or ten-year age bracket were used to calculate D, which ranged from 72% to 81% (see Table 3 ).
Due to technological constraints in the processing of QE and EE forms, all QE and EE reply forms offered only a 6% contribution rate option. Every employee with a 6% contribution rate default had a 6% match threshold, but the match threshold differed from 6% for 77% of mailing recipients with a 0% contribution rate default. The 6% contribution rate on the QE and EE forms could have been less appealing to employees with a different match threshold. Within the group of recipients with a 0% default, we have analyzed those with a match threshold other than 6% separately from those with a match threshold of 6%. The peer information treatment effect estimates are similar across these subsamples, although the standard errors of the estimates for the 6% threshold group are large because of the small sample size.
III. Data
Our data were provided by Aon Hewitt, a large U.S. benefits administration and consulting firm. The data include a cross-sectional snapshot of all employees in our experiment 16 Again, information about employer contributions was personalized. 
IV. Effects of Providing Peer Information
We divide the discussion of our main empirical results into five parts. First, we discuss the characteristics of the employees who received mailings. Second, we analyze the effect of providing peer information in the QE mailing by comparing the savings choices of peer information QE treatment groups to those of the control group that received the QE mailing with no peer information. Third, we restrict our attention to the peer information QE treatment groups and examine the response to the magnitude of the peer information value in the mailing. Fourth, we examine the impact of the peer information given in the EE mailings. And finally, we discuss possible explanations for the perverse peer information effects we observe among QE recipients with a 0% contribution rate default. Table 4 presents summary statistics for the sample that received mailings, broken out by the type of mailing (QE or EE), contribution rate default (0% or 6%), and the type of peer information received. The majority of the sample is male, although this fraction varies considerably across the different subpopulations: 66% among QE recipients with a 0% default, 76% among QE recipients with a 6% default, 55% among EE recipients with a 0% default, and 68% among EE recipients with a 6% default. The average age is 41 years, and average tenure is high-9 years among QE recipients with a 0% default, 7 years among QE recipients with a 6% default, and 11 years in both EE subpopulations. Mean annual salary is in the $35,000 to $50,000 range for all subpopulations except the EE recipients with a 6% default, for whom mean annual salary is above $57,000. Among the two EE subpopulations, average initial before-tax contribution rates are about 2%.
A. Employee Characteristics

B. Effect of Providing Peer Information in Quick Enrollment
To estimate the effect of providing peer information in the QE mailing, we compare the savings choices of peer information QE treatment groups to those of the control group that received no peer information. The first two columns of Table 5 ).
We first look at the non-participants with a 0% contribution rate default. This is the subpopulation that we expected to have the most malleable retirement savings choices. Among this group, 6.3% of employees who were given peer information enrolled in the plan, while 9.9% of those whose mailings did not include peer information enrolled in the plan, a statistically significant difference of 3.6 percentage points. This implies that peer information provision reduces savings plan enrollment. The difference in enrollment rates corresponds to a 20 basis point reduction in the average before-tax contribution rate change as a percent of income, a difference that is significant at the 10% level.
In contrast, we do not find evidence that providing peer information affects nonparticipants who previously opted out of automatic enrollment at a 6% default contribution rate.
There was a 2.7% enrollment rate and a 15 basis point before-tax contribution rate increase within the pooled peer information treatments versus a 0.7% enrollment rate and a 4 basis point before-tax contribution rate increase within the control group without peer information. Neither of these differences is statistically significant. The regression-adjusted impact of providing peer information is qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the effect estimated from comparing means in Table 5 . Including peer information decreases enrollment by 4.0 percentage points and reduces the change in the beforetax contribution rate by 22 basis points for non-participants with a 0% contribution rate default, while it has positive but insignificant effects on non-participants with a 6% contribution rate default.
C. Effect of the Peer Information Value's Magnitude in Quick Enrollment
To examine how the magnitude of the peer information value received by employees affected responsiveness to the QE mailing, we limit our attention to the employees who were in the two peer information QE treatments. An important confound our analysis must address is the "reflection problem" (Manski, 1993) . Because our experiment provided employees with peer information related to their five-year or ten-year age brackets, the peer information value embeds not only information about the peer group but also information about the age-related characteristics of the mailing recipient. Throughout our analysis, we therefore study the relationship between responsiveness to the mailing and the magnitude of the peer information value while controlling for a flexible function of age-specifically, an age spline with knot points every five years starting at age 22½.
Our empirical strategy identifies the effect of the peer information value's magnitude using two sources of variation. First, two employees of the same age may see different peer information values if one is randomly assigned to receive information about her five-year age bracket and the other is randomly assigned to receive information about her ten-year age bracket. 18 We report the estimates from linear probability regressions for the binary dependent variables instead of probit or logit regressions because of problems with perfect predictability. Our flexible age controls sometimes perfectly predict failure, requiring us to drop observations from probit or logit regressions. Adjusting the sample for each regression specification would make it difficult to compare results across specifications, and using a minimal sample for all specifications could potentially give a misleading picture of the results. Thus, we report the results of linear probability regressions, which allow us to maintain a consistent sample and include all observations. 19 As noted in Table 4 , salary information is missing for a small number of employees. We exclude these employees from regression samples throughout the paper. 20 We use a linear spline in age instead of age group dummy variables in Table 6 to be consistent with Table 7 .
Second, two employees who are nearly identical in age may see different peer information values if their ages are on opposite sides of a boundary separating two adjacent five-year or ten-year age brackets. Table 7 presents results from our baseline regression specification for analyzing the impact of the peer information value's magnitude. The coefficient estimates are from ordinary least-squares regressions for the sample of non-participants who received QE mailings with peer information. The outcomes of interest are the same as in Table 6 For non-participants with a 0% contribution rate default, a one percentage point increase in the reported fraction of coworkers participating in the plan results in a statistically significant 1.8 percentage point decrease in the probability of enrolling in the plan and a statistically significant 11 basis point lower change in the before-tax contribution rate. To put these estimates in perspective, the peer information values received by non-participants range from 77% to 93%, a difference of 16 percentage points (Table 3) . This implies an enrollment rate and before-tax contribution rate change that differ by 28 percentage points and 1.7% of income, respectively, between employees who receive the lowest and the highest peer information values-a very large difference relative to the 9.9% enrollment response and 0.6% before-tax contribution rate change of QE recipients with a 0% default who received no peer information (Table 5 ).
In contrast, among non-participants with a 6% default, a one percentage point increase in the peer information value results in a 1.1 percentage point increase in the enrollment rate and a 6 basis point higher increase in the contribution rate, although these effects are significant only at the 10% level. Note the complementarity of the results in Tables 6 and 7 . For non-participants with a 0% default, receiving peer information reduces the response rate to the QE mailings on average (Table 6) , and receiving a peer information value with a higher magnitude further reduces the QE response rate (Table 7) . For QE recipients with a 6% default, receiving peer information leads to a small but insignificant increase in the response rate on average (Table 6) , and the response rate is increasing (at the 10% significance level) in the magnitude of the peer information value (Table 7) . Table 8 shows the importance of the two sources of variation in the peer information value used to generate the results in Table 7 . To facilitate comparison, the first column reproduces the peer information value coefficient estimates from Table 7 . The coefficients in the second column of Table 8 are estimated by adding to the baseline regression specification a set of five-year age bracket dummies that correspond to the age brackets in the five-year age bracket peer information treatment. With the inclusion of these dummies, the effect of the peer information value is no longer identified using discontinuities across age bracket boundaries; rather, identification comes entirely from differences between employees in the five-year versus ten-year age bracket peer information treatments. The peer information coefficients in this specification are slightly larger than in the baseline specification and retain the same qualitative level of statistical significance.
The regression specification presented in the last column of Table 8 excludes the fiveyear age group dummies used in the second column and instead estimates different linear splines in age for employees in the five-year versus ten-year age bracket peer information treatments.
Here, identification comes only from comparing employees on opposite sides of an age bracket boundary at which the peer information value jumps discontinuously. Under this specification, the peer information value coefficients do not change sign, but they are smaller in magnitude and lose their statistical significance. Hence, the effects estimated in the baseline specification from Table 7 are largely driven by the differences in peer information values between the five-year and ten-year age bracket peer information treatments.
In Table 9 , we investigate the robustness of our peer information value results to the manner in which we control for age in our regressions. The first row presents the peer information value coefficients from our baseline specifications in Table 7 to facilitate comparison. In the second row, we replace the original linear spline (knot points every five years) with a linear spline featuring knot points every 2½ years, starting at age 22½. This spline is more flexible and hence gives a sense of whether the structure imposed by the original spline produces misleading results. The coefficients on the peer information value do not change meaningfully with the more flexible spline, and their statistical significance strengthens for employees with a 6% contribution rate default.
One additional element that varied across the QE mailings was the fund in which employee contributions would be invested absent any other election by the employee. (This was not a factor in the EE mailings, since all employees currently contributing to the plan had a preexisting asset allocation.) This default fund was a target date retirement fund (e.g., Fund 2020) chosen according to the recipient's anticipated retirement age and thus varying systematically with age. Although we think it is unlikely that employees would respond to the mailings differentially depending on the target date retirement fund offered, we nonetheless try to account for this possibility by including dummy variables in the regressions for the exact target date retirement fund mentioned in the mailings. As shown in the third row of Table 9 , incorporating these controls does not change our main results.
The specifications in the last two rows of Table 9 are designed to address another set of issues. The two sources of identifying variation in the peer information value are associated with an employee's position within an age bracket. Two employees of the same age who are randomly assigned to the five-year versus ten-year age bracket peer information treatments differ not only in the peer information values they see, but also in the set of peers for whom those values are defined, with one group (the five-year group) more narrowly defined than the other. Similarly, two employees on opposite sides of a boundary separating adjacent five-year or ten-year age brackets are exposed to different peer information values but are also in different situations relative to their peer groups, with one older than most of her peer group and the other younger.
To partially control for these factors, we add to our regressions variables capturing an individual's position relative to her peer information comparison group. The regressions reported in the fourth row of Table 9 include linear and squared terms for the difference in years between the employee's age and the mean age in her peer group; the regressions reported in the fifth row of Table 9 include linear and squared terms for the employee's percentile rank in age within her peer group. All coefficient estimates for the QE recipients with a 0% contribution rate default are qualitatively similar to the baseline coefficient estimates. For the QE recipients with a 6% contribution rate default, the coefficients remain similar in magnitude but lose significance even at the 10% level when we control for the difference between the employee's age and her peer group's mean age.
D. Effect of Providing Peer Information in Easy Escalation
We now turn our attention to the impact of providing peer information to the low savers who received the EE mailings. The first two columns of Table 10 Table 10 report the average before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. The last row in Table 10 shows that the differences between the groups who did and did not receive peer information are close to zero and insignificant for both 0% and 6% default contribution rate participants. Table 11 reports the OLS-adjusted average impact of providing peer information in EE.
In the first two columns, the dependent variable is a binary variable taking a value of one if the employee increased her before-tax contribution rate between August 4, 2008 and September 8, 2008 ; in the next two columns, the dependent variable is the change in the employee's before-tax contribution rate during the same time period. In addition to the controls used in Table 6 for the QE recipients, the regressions for the EE recipients include a full set of indicator variables for each employee's before-tax contribution rate on July 14, 2008-two weeks prior to the mailing.
The results in Table 11 are qualitatively similar to the raw differences reported in Table 10: receiving peer information has a negligible and statistically insignificant effect on savings responses.
Table 12 presents regressions that identify the impact of the peer information value's magnitude in the EE mailings. The dependent variables are the same as in Table 11 . As we did in the corresponding analysis for QE, we restrict the regression sample to EE recipients who were given peer information. We find that the peer information value's magnitude has a positive but insignificant effect on the probability of increasing one's before-tax contribution rate. The peer information value's magnitude also has a positive but insignificant effect on the before-tax contribution rate change, although the p-value for the estimate is below 0.1 for recipients with a 6% contribution rate default.
E. Discussion of Results
The negative response of non-participants with a 0% contribution rate default (unionized employees) to the peer information in the QE mailings is surprising, although it is akin to Costa and Kahn's (2010) finding that certain Republican households respond to peer energy use information by increasing energy consumption. The contrary reaction of non-participants with a 0% default is probably not due to their learning that their coworkers had a lower plan participation rate than expected, since the enrollment rate and contribution rate changes of nonparticipants with a 0% default varied inversely with the magnitude of the peer information value they received. Instead, the boomerang effect among QE recipients with a 0% default is evidence of an oppositional reaction. We discuss three possible mechanisms for this oppositional reaction.
First, unionized non-participants may have perceived their optimal savings behavior to be negatively correlated with that of the coworkers used to construct the peer information value.
Because unionized workers constitute only one-fifth of the firm's workforce, company-wide 401(k) participation rates largely reflect the choices of non-union workers. If unionized employees identify themselves in opposition to non-union employees, they may prefer savings choices that are atypical by company standards. We have tried to examine this hypothesis empirically by testing whether the magnitudes of the peer information effects vary with the fraction of the peer reference group that is unionized. The results do not support the hypothesis.
Second, unionized non-participants may have believed, due to an antagonistic collective bargaining relationship with the firm, that savings messages sent to them by the company were likely to be counter to their own best interests. A related interpretation, in line with psychological reactance theory (Brehm, 1966) , is that mistrust caused unionized non-participants to perceive the peer information as coercive, leading them to act contrary to the peer information in an effort to assert their independent agency. The weakness of this set of hypotheses is that it is not clear why the inclusion of peer information would produce greater mistrust than the control letter, which also strongly encouraged 401(k) participation, nor why mistrust would be increasing in the magnitude of the peer information value.
Finally, non-participants with a 0% contribution rate default may have been discouraged and demotivated by the size of the gap between their own savings behavior and their peers' savings behavior. This mechanism would lead to negative effects from both the presence and the magnitude of the peer information value.
V. Conclusion
Our field experiment shows that exposure to information about the actions of peers can generate an oppositional reaction. Among the subpopulation we expected to be most susceptible to peer influence-employees not enrolled in the 401(k) plan who had a non-enrollment default (in this case, unionized employees)-we found a negative reaction to both the presence and the magnitude of the peer information value. On the other hand, employees who had actively chosen a low 401(k) contribution rate exhibited some positive reaction to the magnitude of the peer information value, but this effect is only statistically significant at the 10% level.
Overall, our results cast doubt on the universal effectiveness of peer information interventions. In some important settings, peer information interventions have limited force and can even produce an effect contrary to that intended. Our experiment provides evidence that oppositional reactions are a significant factor behind such boomerang effects. An important issue for future research is to develop a better understanding of when peer information interventions will work as intended and when they are likely to backfire. information values in the mailings sent to employees in the peer information treatments. Employees not participating in the savings plan were sent the participation rate of employees in either their 5-year or 10-year age bracket (first column). Participating employees with before-tax contribution rates below the minimum of their match threshold and 6% were sent the fraction of participants in either their 5-year or 10-year age bracket whose before-tax contribution rate is at least 6% (third column). August 4, 2008 and September 8, 2008 or the before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. The sample is Quick Enrollment recipients who have a 0% contribution rate default (columns 1 and 3) or a 6% contribution rate default (columns 2 and 4). The linear spline in recipient age has knot points at 22.5, 27.5, 32.5, …, and 67.5. All regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. August 4, 2008 and September 8, 2008 or the before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. The sample is Quick Enrollment recipients with a 0% contribution rate default (columns 1 and 3) or a 6% contribution rate default (columns 2 and 4) who were given peer information. The peer information value was the plan participation rate of coworkers in the recipient's five-year or tenyear age bracket. The linear spline in recipient age has knot points at 22.5, 27.5, 32.5, …, and 67.5. All regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The sample is recipients of Quick Enrollment mailings that included a peer information value equal to the savings plan participation rate of coworkers in either the recipient's five-year or ten-year age bracket. Depending on the row, the sample is further restricted to employees with a 0% contribution rate default or a 6% contribution rate default. The dependent variable is either a dummy for enrolling in the savings plan between August 4, 2008 and September 8, 2008 or the before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. The column headings indicate the source of variation used to identify the peer information value coefficient. All regressions include controls for gender, log tenure, log salary, and a constant, as in Table 7 , as well as a linear spline in recipient age with knot points at 22.5, 27.5, 32.5, …, and 67.5. Additional controls for age are included as indicated in the bottom rows. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Source of identification for the effect of the peer information value Baseline (from Table 7 The sample is recipients of Quick Enrollment mailings that included a peer information value equal to the savings plan participation rate of coworkers in either the recipient's five-year or ten-year age bracket. The sample is further restricted to those with a 0% contribution rate default (columns 1 and 3) or a 6% contribution rate default (columns 2 and 4). The dependent variable is either a dummy for enrolling in the plan between August 4, 2008 and September 8, 2008 or the before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. All regressions include controls for gender, log tenure, log salary, and a constant, as in Table 7 . The regressions vary in how they control for recipient age: (1) a linear spline in age with knot points at 22.5, 27.5, 32.5, …, and 67.5 (every five years), which is the baseline; (2) a linear spline in age with knot points at 22.5, 25, 27.5, …, and 67.5 (every 2.5 years); (3) a linear spline in age with knot points every 5 years and dummies for the target date retirement fund offered, which is dependent on age; (4) a linear spline in age with knot points every five years and controls for the number of years the recipient is from the age group mean (linear and squared terms); or (5) a linear spline in age with knot points every five years and controls for the recipient's percentile rank in the age group (linear and squared terms). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. August 4, 2008 and September 8, 2008 and the before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. Easy Escalation recipients in the peer information treatments were shown the fraction of plan participants in their five-year or ten-year age bracket with before-tax contribution rates of at least 6%. Standard errors appear in parentheses. *, **, and *** in the last row indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Fraction who increased before-tax contribution rate Average before-tax contribution rate change 0% default 6% default 0% default 6% default ( August 4, 2008 and September 8, 2008 or the before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. The sample is Easy Escalation recipients with a 0% contribution rate default (columns 1 and 3) or a 6% contribution rate default (columns 2 and 4). The linear spline in age has knot points at 22.5, 27.5, 32.5, …, and 67.5. Before-tax contribution rates as of July 14, 2008 are controlled for using a full set of contribution rate dummies. All regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. August 4, 2008 and September 8, 2008 or the before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. The sample is Easy Escalation recipients who were given peer information and have a 0% contribution rate default (columns 1 and 3) or a 6% contribution rate default (columns 2 and 4). The peer information value was the fraction of savings plan participants in the recipient's fiveyear or ten-year age bracket with before-tax contribution rates of at least 6%. The linear spline in age has knot points at 22.5, 27.5, 32.5, …, and 67.5. Before-tax contribution rates as of July 14, 2008 are controlled for using a full set of contribution rate dummies. All regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
